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Respondents Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith, "Smiths11, hereb] 
petition the Utah Court of Appeals for a rehearing of the Appeal taken b} 
Appellant Western Auto Radiator Co, , Inc., "Western", from the Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, The Honorable 
Dean E. Conder, District Judge, pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
The points of law or fact which Smiths claim the Court of Appeals 
has overlooked or misapprehended are as follows: 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
INDULGED A PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS; WESTERN HAS NOT DISCHARGED ITS 
BURDEN OF SHOWING ERROR; AND THE RECORD SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN A LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS WHICH ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are to be liberally construed 
to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. 
Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The policy expressed in Rule 1 is reflected in many decisions of 
the Supreme Court holding that findings of fact and judgments should be 
presumed correct; appellants must affirmatively show error; records 
should be reviewed in the light most favorable to the findings and 
judgment; and that when substantial support exists in the record for the 
findings and judgment the lower court result will not be disturbed. See 
e.g., Kohler vs. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); Hutcheson vs. 
Gleaye, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981) and Seaich vs. Union Pac. R. Co., 649 
P.2d 48 (Utah 1982). 
Further, the appellant has the burden of marshalling all evidence 
in support of the findings and demonstrating that even reviewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is 
still insufficient and if he does not do so, the appellant's attack on 
the findings is not to be considered. Scharf vs. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068 (Utah 1985). 
Here, the trial court heard several days of evidence consisting 
mainly of one attack after another by the purchasing shareholders on 
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Smiths. The Trial Court heard Smiths' explanations in the course of 
their testimony and considered Smiths' time summaries showing the 
consumption of their professional time by the litigation. 
The evidence shows much of Smiths professional time was consumed 
in defending themselves against numerous charges of breaches of fiduciary 
duty to Western and to Plaintiffs. Further, virtually all financial 
information assembled for the parties at trial was located or prepared by 
Smiths. See Smiths' original Brief, pages 30-34. 
The evidence shows Smiths have incurred substantial attorney's 
fees in defending the litigation (and more fees on the appeal). 
Judge Conder suggested that the matter of attorney's fees and 
Smiths' time be submitted by proffers of evidence rather than additional 
testimony, hopefully to conserve court time, and this was done. 
Judge Conder heard the evidence presented prior to settlement, 
considered Smiths' time and effort and the efforts of Smiths' counsel and 
on the basis of the testimony, exhibits, proffered evidence and post-
trial memoranda, awarded Smiths much less than they sought and Smiths' 
attorney much less than would have been an objectively reasonably 
attorney's fee. 
Judge Conder's Findings, though brief, were adequate. The court 
found Smiths efforts were of benefit to the other parties, including 
Western; that Smiths acted in good faith; and that the portion of Smiths' 
professional time which was necessarily, fairly and reasonably expended 
in connection with the litigation in good faith which should be assessed 
against Western Auto Radiator was the sum of $5,514.60 in the case oi 
Willard L. Smith and $7,565.60 in the case of Keith Smith; and that, ir 
view of all of the circumstances of the case, Defendants Smith were 
fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification for said sums and thai 
Smiths actually and reasonably incurred attorney's fees and costs oi 
court in connection with the Smiths' defense of the law suit and that the 
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services rendered in view of the time necessarily expended, the 
qualifications and expertise of counsel and the evidence concerning the 
reasonability of attorney's fees properly supported an award of 
$18,450.00 together with court costs in the sum of $278.57. (See 
Findings of Fact contained in the Appendix to Appellant's Brief). 
These Findings of Fact clearly indicated the mind of the Court. 
They show that the judgment followed logically from and was supported by 
an abundance of evidence. There can be no reasonable inference other 
than that Judge Conder found against a number of contentions made by 
Plaintiffs including the contention Smiths should be indemnified at the 
rate of only $14.00 or $15.00 per hour. 
Judge Conder's Findings of Fact do in fact satisfy the finding 
standard of Parks vs. Zions First national Bank, 673 P. 2d 996 (Utah 
1983). 
The Scharf, supra, rule should have been applied in this case and 
Judge Conderfs Judgment affirmed since Appellant failed to marshall the 
evidence in support of the findings. Appellant's Brief totally ignores 
the trial court's findings and simply makes a number of factual 
assertions against Smiths, unsupported by and basically contrary to the 
findings, with virtually no references to the record. See Appellant's 
Brief, pages 2-16. 
Even apart from the Scharf rule, since sufficient evidence does 
support Judge Conder's award, his judgment should be affirmed. Shoiji 
vs. Shoiji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985); Sharpe vs. American Medical 
Systems, Inc., 671 P. 2d 185 (Utah 1983); and Seaich vs. Union Pacific R. 
Co., 649 P.2d 1948 (Utah 1982). 
To vacate the judgment and remand the case where it will have to 
be tried before an entirely new judge, since Judge Conder has retired 
from the bench, unjustly disadvantages Smiths who have already suffered 
substantial economic loss from having a substantial part of their 
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professional time claim denied by Judge Conder. 
Judge Conder was an experienced, seasoned lawyer and a wise trial 
judge. No reason exists for not presuming his findings were proper. 
Appellant did not show error or insufficiency of evidence under 
the Scharf rule. Clearly, this case is entitled to application of the 
standards of review set forth in the Scharf, Kohler, Hutcheson, Shoiji, 
Sharpe, and Seaich cases to bring an end to this costly, expensive, time 
consuming litigation. 
Apparently Judge Richard Moffat to whom this case will be 
assigned has an extremely busy trial calendar and will not be able to 
retry this matter until some time next Fall. 
If Smiths are compelled to retry the matter of all the 
professional time they spent in defending Plaintiffs' numerous, ever 
changing charges and all of the services they performed for Western and 
the other litigants, and endeavor to put their time into various 
categories so Judge Moffat can make comprehensive, detailed findings, and 
Judge Moffat makes a new or amended award and once again Western is not 
satisfied with the result, then Western will surely appeal again witt 
consequent additional consumption of time, energy and scarce judicial 
resources. 
Further, if the trial courts in Utah are to be required to make 
the kind of comprehensive, detailed findings of fact in all cases 
suggested by the Memorandum Decision, such a burden should be establishec 
by the Utah Supreme Court, and that only after appropriate discussioi 
between the Supreme Court and District Judges in light of Rule 1 because 
of the additional substantial burden that places on the trial courts. 
Smiths earnestly submit that a fair reading of the Findings 
together with Judge Conder!s Memorandum Decision, in view of the facti 
and circumstances of this case and the evidence presented below, show, 
that substantial justice has been done and that this litigation shouL 
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come to an end by affirmance of Judge Conderfs judgment and that there is 
no need for yet additional chapters in this matter. 
POINT II. THE COURT SHOULD DIRECT THAT THE SUBSTITUTE SUPERSEDEAS 
BOND ARRANGEMENT STIPULATED BY THE PARTIES REMAIN IN EFFECT PENDING FINAL 
DISPOSITION OF THIS MATTER. 
Annexed hereto, marked Exhibit "A", is a copy of the Stipulation 
for Security in lieu of supersedeas bond filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court together with a copy of the time certificate of deposit 
referred to therein. 
Paragraph 3 of said Stipulation provides in material part that the 
certificate of deposit shall be held pending resolution of the Appeal 
taken by Western and should stand in lieu of a supersedeas bond for the 
same purpose until the Appeal should be finally resolved. 
Western has demanded immediate, unconditional delivery of the 
certificate of deposit in view of the Memorandum Decision of this Court 
which vacated the judgment made by Judge Conder although the Memorandum 
Decision did not hold Smiths should be awarded nothing and remanded the 
case for retrial. 
Judge Conder?s award runs only against Western, a corporation 
now in the sole control of the Plaintiff purchasing shareholders. Smiths 
are no longer on the Board of Directors. 
If Western obtains a return of the certificate of deposit and the 
fortune of the radiator repair business later makes it impossible for 
Western to pay the award ultimately secured, then great unfairness and 
injustice will have been visited on Smiths. 
Smiths therefore most earnestly request this Court to direct that 
the supersedeas substitute remain in force and effect until final 
determination of this matter, because it is clear that Smiths are 
entitled to indemnification in some amount for their time and 
indemnification for reasonable attorney's fees. 
This Court should interpret the Stipulation itself to permit 
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continued holding of the certificate of deposit pending the final 
outcome, or apply Rule 67, Deposit In Court, or Injunction Rule 
65A(e)(3), which rules allow the imposition of conditions such as may be 
just upon a deposit of money and injunctions against action in violation 
of the rights of another party respecting the subject matter of the 
action which would tend to render the judgment ineffectual. 
Simple justice and fairness to the Smiths entitles them to a 
ruling of this Court that, even if they must undergo further trial 
proceedings, at least the supersedeas equivalent will remain in effect to 
secure the award they ultimately obtain. 
POINT III. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE VACATED. 
Even if Judge Moffat must retry the case on the indemnity issues 
and make extended findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Judgment 
already made should not be vacated for Judge Moffat may well come up with 
the same award or an award which is even larger in amount. 
The present judgment entered by Judge Conder entitles the Smiths 
to interest. Vacating it deprives them of that right. 
To apply justice, if this case must be remanded, it should only be 
remanded for the making of such additional findings as this Court directs 
and for the making of any modifications to the award as Judge Moffat 
deems appropriate. 
There is no justification for penalizing Smiths with a loss oJ 
interest by vacating the Judgment because Smiths are entitled tc 
indemnity for some amount for their professional time and for attorney '.< 
fees. 
POINT IV. SMITHS ARE ENTITLED TO BE INDEMNIFIED A REAS0NABL1 
AMOUNT FOR THEIR PROFESSIONAL TIME AND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED II 
DEFENDING AGAINST THE MANY CLAIMS AGAINST THEM MADE THROUGH TRIAL. 
The Memorandum Decision of this Court suggests in footnote 2, pag« 
4, that Smiths may not be entitled to be indemnified for thei 
professional time or for attorney's fees for time and services past th 
6 
pre-trial conference. 
The Memorandum Decision does not express any reason or policy wh^  
such should be the case and entirely overlooks the fact that substantia] 
claims were inserted against Smiths by Plaintiff in the pre-trial order, 
and further overlooks the fact that numerous additional claims were 
asserted against them during the trial itself. (See Smiths' Brief pages 
6 and 11 and R. 230). 
The trial court found that Smiths were fairly and reasonably 
entitled to be indemnified for professional time and for reasonable 
attorney's fees for defense services beyond the pre-trial conference -- a 
necessary implication from the amounts awarded in view of the time 
expended, and thus, by implication, found against Plaintiff's contention 
(made for the very first time on appeal) that they weren't really serious 
about all the claims made against Smiths after all, so Smiths shouldn't 
even have defended. 
No shadow of reason appears to support this strange contention of 
the Plaintiff. It is the more astonishing for its blatancy! 
Further, this footnote and other parts of this Court's Memorandum 
Decision suggest the proper approach to indemnification of directors is 
narrow and restrictive. This is clearly not the law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held, and a statute in the 
state of Utah requires that Utah Statutes be interpreted liberally to 
implement their evident intent. Section 68-3-2, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953): 
"The rule of the common law that 
statutes in derogation thereof are to be 
strictly construed has no application to the 
statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting 
the subjects to which they relate, and their 
provisions and all proceedings under them are 
to be liberally construed with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice. Whenever there is any 
variance between the rules of equity and the 
rules of common law in reference to the same 
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matter, the rules of equity shall prevail." 
There is absolutely no factual or legal basis at all for the 
suggestion that the final pre-trial marked the end of any "real threat 
to the Smiths" or that the indemnification statute is to be interpreted 
narrowly. 
If the claims of the purchasing shareholders against Smiths were 
frivolous, they should have abandoned them before trial. Plaintiffs 
would not do so. Their numerous, ever changing claims were in fact 
unmeritorious. That Plaintiff insisted on pursuing unmeritorious claims 
only makes them guilty of abuse of process or malicious prosecution. 
Such does not justify denial of indemnity to the Smiths for defending 
against them. 
It is grossly unfair to say that Smiths should not have defended 
themselves from manifestly, unfair, inappropriate, unsubstantial claims 
by saying such claims posed no real threat to Smiths. 
Smiths are entitled to a fair and liberal interpretation of the 
indemnification statute, particularly where they were, in effect, 
successful on the merits because at the time of the settlement between 
the other parties, all claims of every kind and nature against them were 
dropped by the purchasing shareholders. 
This Court should hold clearly and unequivocally that the 
indemnity statute in the corporation code is to be interpreted 
liberally with a view to promoting the objects for which it was enacted 
and not restrictively and harshly for the purpose of narrowly limiting 
what indemnification a wrongfully sued director can receive from the 
corporation. 
The Decision of the Court of Appeals should recognize the 
breadth of the Indemnification Statute, i.e.: 
"(3) To the extent that a director, 
officer, employee or agent of a corporation 
has been successful on the merits, or 
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otherwise, in the defense of any action, suit 
or proceeding referred to in (1) or (2) of 
this subsection or in defense of any claim, 
issue or matter therein, he shall be 
indemnified against expenses (including 
attorney's fees) actually and reasonably 
incurred by him in connection therewith." 
(Emphasis added) Section 16-10-4(o)(3), Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). 
Subsection 2 of the statute broadly permits a trial court to 
indemnify even a director found liable for negligence or misconduct 
where the court determines "such person is fairly and reasonably 
entitled to indemnity for such expenses which such court shall deem 
proper11. Section 16-10-4(o) (2) , Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Smiths were not found liable for any negligence or misconduct. 
Judge Conder determined them to be fairly and reasonably entitled to the 
indemnity he awarded them to the amounts he awarded, which was less than 
that sought. He obviously exercised a broad and reasonable discretion 
and absolutely no reason appears why his reasoned and fair judgment 
should not be sustained. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals should recognize the purpose 
and intent of the indemnification statute. If directors must risk a 
narrow, rigid interpretation of the statute, few corporations 
especially small corporations will be able to attract any kind of 
qualified independent professional people to serve on their boards of 
directors and that is a matter of major public concern today. 
The Court should clearly and unequivocally rule that the statute 
means the trial court has broad latitude and discretion in determining 
what expenses are proper expenses of defense, including reasonable 
attorney*s fees, because that is what the statute says. 
Judge Conder fs findings were couched in the terms used by the 
indemnification statute. Shouldn't that be sufficient? 
If litigants can now come to this Court, raise all sorts of 
questions and issues for the first time and get a ruling requiring a 
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retrial to carefully consider all their new questions and issues and 
requiring the lower court to make detailed findings on them, there will 
be absolutely no end to litigation. Justice and fairness will be 
forever lost. Utah will need who knows how many new trial courts to 
endlessly consider every new nuance and possibility. Citizens with less 
than unlimited resources will be well advised never to ask the courts 
for relief. 
Only if substantial policy reasons exist to compel the new trial 
judge to categorize and characterize Smiths' professional time and 
Smiths attorney's fees several ways should there be a remand. There is 
no policy reason for trying to characterize Smiths' litigation-consumed 
professional time into accounting services unrelated to defense, or 
related to defense or in the nature of expert witness fees or into other 
categories unless the purpose be to severely limit Smiths' recovery for 
their time and to limit their recovery of attorney's fees. 
This Court should clearly hold that a broad interpretation of 
expense is indicated by the indemnification statute and that if there 
must be a remand, the new trial judge is to liberally construe the 
indemnification statute in favor of the Smiths. 
This Court should hold that professional outside officers and 
directors are not to be compelled to expend vast amounts of 
uncompensated personal time demonstrating their adherence to duty. 
This Court should hold directly and unequivocally that Smiths, as 
professional, outside directors are entitled to the reasonable value of 
all their professional time necessarily consumed by the litigation and 
not only limited portions thereof. 
If there are policy reasons to the contrary, this Court should 
enunciate them and then carefully define and sharply limit what kind of 
uncompensated time this Court feels Smiths must contribute and what kind 
of attorney's fees they must personally absorb even though they were 
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wrongfully sued as Directors and no fault was found in them. 
Smiths urge this Court to recognize the key fact that this 
litigation was terminated by the other parties once the selling 
shareholder determined that he would agree to a settlement. There was 
no finding or determination that Smiths caused the corporation or the 
other parties interested therein any loss or damage of any kind. There 
was no determination they breached any duty. 
The settlement which occurred meant that there was absolutely no 
opportunity for any final ruling in favor of Smiths on the merits 
because all claims against Smiths were abandoned. 
There was no opportunity for the lower Court to determine whether 
the claims made against Smiths were in the category of vexatious, 
malicious claims, which would entitle Smiths to file another proceeding 
for damages for abuse of process or malicious prosecution. 
All Judge Conder did was to determine that Smiths were not to be 
required to bear the full economic loss of contributing their 
professional time to litigation rather than pursuing their independent 
CPA practices and to allow them reasonable attorney's fees. 
If this is to be remanded for a new trial before Judge Moffat, 
this Court should direct Judge Moffat to determine the extent to which 
the claims made against Smiths were unsupported and vexatious and to 
take that into consideration in determining what award(s) should be made 
to Smiths. 
POINT V. SMITHS SHOULD BE INDEMNIFIED AGAINST ALL ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST THE VARIOUS CLAIMS MADE 
AGAINST THE SMITHS THROUGH THE TIME OF MID-TRIAL SETTLEMENT AND 
THEREAFTER IN PRESENTING CLAIMS MADE BY SMITHS FOR INDEMNIFICATION TO 
THE COURT BELOW AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN RESPECT TO DEFENDING THE 
INDEMNIFICATION AWARDS ON APPEAL. 
This Court's Memorandum Decision suggest that on remand the trial 
court should not only scrutinize, distinguish and categorize the Smiths' 
activities which comprised their professional time consumed by the 
litigation but also the nature and kind of legal services performed in 
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respect to their defense and in presentation of their indemnity claims. 
The Decision is not clear as to what categories Smiths' legal 
services should be fitted into, nor is any reason postulated why such an 
approach should be taken. 
Smiths submit there is no reason for trying to make such fine 
distinctions under the broad terms of the indemnification statute, 
especially in view of the fact the trial court's legal fees award was 
modest and substantially less than sought. 
The helpful expert witness, implied contract and trustee defense 
cost entitlement doctrines are additional reasons to construe the 
indemnification statute fairly in favor of Smiths and not reasons to cut 
down Judge Conder's award by endeavoring to fit Smiths' time or legal 
fees into categories. 
In this case Smiths were sued as officers and directors of 
Western and were required to defend. They tried to be helpful. They 
sat in conferences. They explained accounting matters. They prepared 
summaries. They researched tax complications. They testified in Court. 
They lost all that time to being sued. They received no monthly salary 
or other regular payments from Western as did all the other parties to 
the litigation. 
This Court should not suggest that some of Smiths' time was 
compensable and some was not without a good reason. Nor should this 
Court hold some of their attorney's fees were compensable and some not 
without a good reason. 
Appellant has not shown any reason why the attorney's fees award 
was improper. Appellant did not urge Judge Conder to divide Smiths' 
counsel's time into compensable and non-compensable categories. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not apparently had an occasion to 
interpret the indemnification section of Section 16-10-4(o) of Utah 
Business Corporation Act. This case provides a significant opportunity 
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to provide helpful guidance in this area. 
The question of whether the statute is to be liberally or 
narrowly construed is a matter of considerable importance. 
This Court should rule it is to be liberally construed and why 
and publish its decision. 
POINT VI. THE SMITHS ARE ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES 
FOR DEFENDING THE APPEAL. 
The Memorandum Decision overlooks the issue of Smiths entitlement 
to indemnification for attorney's fees for legal services on appeal. 
See Point 5 of Smiths' appeal brief. 
If the case must be remanded, as matters now stand, Judge Moffat 
is without guidance on this point. 
No reason exist to deprive Smiths of the expense of defending the 
award made by Judge Conder on appeal. 
Certainly a proper liberal interpretation of the indemnification 
Statute entitles them to fees on the appeal. This is first a question 
of law -- of statute interpretation and policy. It is for the appellate 
courts ultimately, and not the trial courts, to make legal 
interpretations and to determine how statutes are to be interpreted and 
applied. 
This Court should directly and affirmatively hold that Smiths are 
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees for the Appeal. 
Western now argues that this Court has ruled Smiths have to bear 
their own attorney's fees on appeal because of the final sentence in the 
Memorandum Decision which states: " The parties shall bear their own 
costs of this Appeal." Counsel for Western argues "costs" include 
Smiths' attorney's fees for the defense of the appeal. 
Rule 34 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals defines "costs 
on appeal" and the definition does not include attorney's fees. 
This Court should clearly hold that Smiths are entitled to 
attorney's fees for defending the appeal and for attorney's fees in any 
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further pursuit of indemnification before Judge Moffat. 
If this Court is of the opinion that any substantial portion of 
their attorney's fees must be born by Smiths, the service denied should 
be made clear and the reason why stated. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Conder's findings in terms of the indemnification statute 
should be indulged a presumption of correctness since Western failed to 
demonstrate insufficiency of the evidence to support them and because, 
in fact, substantial evidence does support them. 
Judge Conder's Findings in the broad fairness terms of the 
indemnification statute are sufficiently indicative of the Court's mind 
to satisfy the Parks vs. Zions First National Bank standard. 
The indemnification statute should be liberally interpreted to 
effect the objects thereof. A liberal interpretation mandates 
affirmance of Judge Conder's decision. 
If a burden of making more comprehensive factual findings than 
very often happens is to be imposed, such should be imposed by the 
Supreme Court, which should very carefully consider such matters in 
light of the practices and policies of District Judges and the trial 
burdens which they face. 
The award should not be vacated. If the case has to be remanded, 
the decision should be left in place and Judge Moffat should be directed 
only to modify the judgment to the extent he deems modification 
appropriate in view of the evidence which will have to be reproduced at 
a retrial. This Court should rule that a liberal interpretation of the 
indemnification statute should be taken by Judge Moffat in retrying the 
matter. 
This Court should rule that the supersedeas arrangement made 
will be continued until judgment finality. 
The Court should hold that Smiths are entitled to reasonable 
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attorney's fees for legal services on appeal and in connection with this 
Petition and to a further award of counsel fees in pursuing any further 
trial proceedings. 
The remand should be limited to determining the amount of 
attorney's fees to be added to the award for services on appeal. 
DATED this 30th day of/W^rch, 
DAVID S. COOK 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
Willard L. Smith and 
Keith C. Smith 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition for Rehearing is 
presented in good faith and not for delay but for the purpose of 
avoiding, if possible, or at least limiting, the further costs, expenses 
and delay that will necessarily be incurred by a retrial. 
Attorney for Petitioners/ 
Respondents Smith 
Served the foregoing Petition by delivering four copies thereof 
to James A. Mclntyre, attorney for Appellant, 6775 South 900 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84107-0280, this 31st day of March, 1988. 
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James A. Mclntyre - 2196 
McINTYRE & DENNIS, P.C. 
Attorney for Western Auto 
Radiator Co., Inc. 
P. 0. Box 7280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-0280 
Telephone: (801) 561-8500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE GOODRICH, DAVID HOYT, 
VAL KIDMAN, STERLING JONES, 
and DANIEL WAYMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO. 
INC., a Utah Corporation, and ) 
WILLIAM W. BOWERBANK, WILLARD ) 
L. SMITH, JONATHAN BOWERBANK, ' 
KIM BOWERBANK and KEITH C. 
SMITH, ] 
Defendants. 1 
1 STIPULATION FOR SECURITY IN 
) LIEU OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Civil No. C84-924 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc., by and through its 
counsel, and Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith, by and 
through their counsel, hereby stipulate as follows: 
1. Western Auto Radiator Co. will immediately transfer 
the sums of $4,029.69 and $13,208.76 from Western Auto 
Radiator accounts in Continental Bank to Guardian State Bank, 
142 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Said sums of $4,029.69 and $13,208.76, together with 
Western Auto Radiator funds in said Guardian State Bank in the 
EXHIBIT "A" 
sum of $15,843.07, shall be used to purchase a Certificate of 
Deposit issued by Guardian State Bank to Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc., authorized signatures concerning which shall be 
those of James A. Mclntyre, attorney for Western Auto Radiator 
Co. and David S. Cook, attorney for Willard L. Smith and Keith 
C. Smith. 
3. Said Certificate of Deposit shall bear such maturity 
date and such interest rate as may be determined by Western 
Auto Radiator Co. and Guardian State Bank. The Certificate of 
Deposit shall be held by David S. Cook, attorney for Willard 
L. Smith and Keith C. Smith, pending resolution of the appeal 
taken by Western Auto Radiator Co. in the captioned action and 
shall stand in lieu of a supersedeas bond and for the same 
purpose until said appeal has been finally resolved. 
4. The making of this stipulation shall not constitute 
any waiver of claims or positions any party may desire to take 
in connection with said appeal. 
5. The making of this stipulation does not constitute a 
waiver of the Smiths1 claim against Western Auto Radiator Co., 
Inc. for interest at the judgment rate on the judgment in this 
matter dated May 8, 1986, in favor of the Smiths against 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. 
DATED this / ? % day of September, 1986. 
Western Auto Radiator Company, Inc. 
JAMES/ri/ McINTYRE, AttorneV) for 
WestecjT Auto Radiator Company, Inc. 
DATED this J2 day of September, 1986. 
Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith 
DAVIDS. Ca^ J<r Attorney for Willard 
L. Smith and Keith C. Smith 
J ^ t U t J U X ****xx*x*yt*Jtw***W***W**WX****ie*x* 
miS CERTIFIES THAT THERE HAS BEEN DEPOSITED 
IN THIS INSTITUTION THE AMOUNT OF E GUTODW1 STOTC BNNK P.O. BOX 1947 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110 N2 212 
* * • * • 
PAYABLE TO 
' r*Tr»^ rTTC?DKT ATTT^V D Jl H T R .TVNO ADDRE 
/1QQ*********************** DOLLARS 
WESTERN AOTO RADIATOR SS 567 South 2nd e a s t SIC 84111 
TYPE OF TCD SOC SEC. OR TAX ID NO. INTEREST RATE (NTEREST PAYABLE DATE OF ISSUE MATURITY DATE AMOUNT DEPOSITED 
00 87-0272096 5.75 per % annum 183Days 9-24-86 3-26-87 33081.12 
f THIS CERTIFICATE IS AUTOMATICALLY RENEWABLE IT WILL BE RENEWED FOR SUCCESSIVE LIKE MATURITY PERIODS IF THE CERTIFICATE IS NOT PRESENTED AND SURRENDERED FOR PAYMENT WITHIN SEVEN 
7) Q D A r S — ONE. (1) DAY O AFTER THE ORIGINAL OR ANY RENEWEO MATURITY DATE, OR UNLESS THE INSTITUTION ISSUES OR MAILS NOTICE TO THE CONTRARY TO DEPOSITORS). OR TO EITHER OR ANY 
X SAID DEPOSITORS AT LEAST TEN (10) BUSINESS DAYS BEFORE ANY SUCH MATURITY DATE. AND ANY MAILED NOTICE SHALL BE SENT TO THE ADDRESS AfiiOVE OR THEN DESIGNATED ON INSTITUTION'S RE-
;ORDS THE INTEREST RATE FOR EACH RENEWAL PERIOD SHALL BE THE PREVAILING RATE OF THE INSTITUTION ON NEW TIME CERTIFICATES OF LIKE DURATION ON RENEWAL DATE. SUBJECT TO APPLICABLE 
RESENT AND FUTURE STATE AND FEOERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN THE EVENT CERTIFICATE IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENEWED, DEPOSIT BEARS NO INTEREST AFTER ORIGINAL OR FINAL RENEWED MATUR-
TY 
HIS CERTIFICATE IS PAYABLE IN CURRENT FUNDS AT MATURITY UPON SURRENDER OF THIS CERTIFICATE PROPERLY ENDORSED THIS CERTIFICATE MAY BE REDEEMED IN ADVANCE OF THE MATURITY DATE ONLY 
183 Q MONTHS Cpf>AYS 
Q WEEKS D YEARS 
VITH THE CONSENT OF THE INSTITUTION AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PtNALTY FOR EARLY WITHDRAWAL. THE MATURITY OF THIS CERTIFICATE WILL BE 
kFTER THE DATE OF ISSUE OF THIS CERTIFICATE THEREAFTER THIS CERTIFICATE WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS 




• SEND INTEREST BY CASHIER'S CHECKS 
D DEPOSIT TO ANOTHER ACCOUNT 
• QUARTERLY FROM INTEREST DATE 
CXAT MATURITY 
O OTHER 
i: 121.00 273 Bi: 
bA+y 
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE 
•te*t Bar* Not* SO0 (V85) 
=SX^Cg&£ TRANSFERABLE ONLY ON THE BOOKS OF, OR WITH PERMISSION OF, THE ISSUING INSTITUTION. <^Q^XFZ 
^ * ^ NON-NEGOTIABLE ^ ^ 
=& 
EARLY WITHDRAWAL PENALTY 
tear Depositor. 
:
»nancial Regulatory Agencies require us to furnish you with the following information concerning the Early Withdrawal Penalty applicable to your deposit: 
You may not withdraw all or any part of your deposit prior to maturity except with the consent of the Financial Institution, which may be given only at the time 
such request for withdrawal is made. 
H the Financial institution consents to withdrawal before maturity, at the time the withdrawal is made, the following applicable penalty will be assessed: (check 
Applicable Deposit) 
• # ) Time Deposit No ? 1 7,1 maturing on 3 - 2 6 - 8 * 7 • 
1.) If the maturity is one year or lets, but at least 32 days, you must forfeit the equivalent of one month interest on the amount withdrawn calcu-
lated at the nominal (simple interest) rate being paid on the time deposit. 
2.) If the maturity is more than one year, you must forfeit the equivalent of three months interest on the amount withdrawn calculated at the nomi-
nal (simple interest) rate being paid on the time deposit. 
3.) If the amount required to bs forfeited exceeds the amount of earned interest in your account, this amount will be deducted from the amount you 
request to withdraw. 
D B) 7-31 Day Certificate of Deposit No. , issued on_ 
1.) You must forfeit an amount equal to the greater of: 
i. All interest earned on the amount withdrawn from the most recent of the date of deposit, the date of maturity, or the date on which notice 
was given; or 
ii. The equivalent of all interest that could have been earned on the amount during a period equal to 1/2 the fixed maturity term or required 
notice period. 
2.) In addition, for any day where the principal balance of the certificate falls below interest will be payable only at the 
maximum rate allowable for regular savings deposits or accounts. 
3.) Deposits made after the date of issue, if such additional deposits are allowed, must remain on deposit for the full notice period or fixed term. 
Withdrawals will be deemed to be from the funds on deposit the longest. 
[. If the amount required to be forfeited exceeds the amount of earned interest on your certificate/account, this amount will be deducted from the amount you 
request to withdraw. 
. No penalty will be assessed for withdrawals in the event you, as the owner of the funds, become deceased, or are judicially declared mentally incompetent. 
Sign the statement below that applies to you. 
UNDER PENALTIES PERJURY, I eaffty thai I am an aiampt radpiant undar * t 
Urn (aaa inatruebom). 
v 87-0272096 
SOCIAL S*fljRITY NJJM8ER OR EMPLOYER ID. NUMBER ^j 
UNDER PENALTIES OF PEjrfuRY. I ewWy that tfw abova mimbar it my ©©"act toipaVttai 
ton numb*. \ 
The undersigned acknowledges receipt of a copy hereof. 




UNDER PENALTIES Of PERJURY. I CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT SUBJECT TO BACKUP WlTHHOtD-
MQ +** bacauaa I hava not baa* «o**ad lhat » am »ub^ct to backup iHhhokttog a* a raawft of 
a lanwa » rapon a«< miaraat or o>**aa«di or ma mtamai Ravanua Sarvioa haa no«mad ma ttat I am 
Depositor's 
Signature _ 
Date. 
